Controversy in science is, on the whole, a good thing; it clarifies issues, separates fact from theory to the extent that this is appropriate, and preserves the objectivity of science. Distortions, however, can occur in the course of controversy and may confuse the uninformed reader. I hope to demonstrate in these comments that the paper under review (Johnson, Maher, & Barber, 1972) as it bears on the nature of hyponotic phenomena not only contains inadequacies in the design of the experiment and the collection of data, but that the presentation of the data, and their statistical treatment, leave much to be desired. The end result is that the investigation can neither substantiate nor refute the trance-logic hypothesis the authors set out to test.
The Johnson et al. paper is a criticism of transparent and double hallucinations of persons reported by Orne (1959) and of Orne's interpretation of his results according to trance logic, that is, the willingness of hypnotic 5s to ' The paper under comment is that by Johnson, Maher, and Barber (1972) , which appears in this issue; the paper is in turn based upon a doctoral dissertation (Johnson, 1970) . The assistance of Grant MH-38S9 from the National Institute of Mental Health is gratefully acknowledged. It has made possible my familiarity with hypnotic phenomena appropriate to the present comments.
2 Requests for reprints should be sent to Ernest R. Hilgard, Director of Hypnosis Research Program, Department of Psychology, Stanford, California 94305. tolerate logical inconsistencies. Because I have on several occasions demonstrated Orne's essential findings before my classes, I felt that there must be some reason to account for the curious fact that the authors failed to find some of his phenomena at all. Hence, I looked for differences in the manner in which the authors obtained their data and arrived at their negative conclusions.
The general orientation of the authors is indicated by three initial reasons they gave for undertaking the investigation. I shall begin with a few comments on these.
1. The first statement by the authors, that Orne's results are reported informally, is correct, but it does not follow that they are to be discounted. The purpose of doing a more formal experiment along Orne's lines should be, first, to reproduce the phenomena he actually observed and then to specify more clearly the conditions, the frequency with which the phenomena occur in different groups, and so on. As we shall see, the experiment proceeded with such differences from his that the phenomena were not clearly reproduced at all.
2. The next point made by the authors is that Orne confounded three antecedent variables: preexisting differences in suggestibility, differences in training to respond to suggestions, and differences in instructions. Hence, 221 their statement, "no conclusions can be drawn." As will be pointed out, Orne was actually quite clear in what the was doing, and because the authors do not follow the logic of his position they have produced an experiment that bears only remotely upon his.
3. The paper alleges that no experiment has as yet been published to cross-validate Orne's original observations. While in an exact sense there has been no replication, there are indeed closely related observations, readily available to the authors in sources that they cite, which give support to Orne's findings. I refer to the experiments on the hallucinated second light, upon which evidence has been systematically gathered under standard and precise instructions whenever the Stanford Profile Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form I, is administered. 3 The 5 is told that when he opens his eyes he will see two lights on a small box, which actually has one light on it. If he reports seeing them (corresponding to the double hallucination), he is asked to describe them, and then, being informed that only one is real, he is asked, "Can you tell which is real?" Note that the questioning is quite systematic, and there is no leading question about transparency or any other phenomenal difference between the lights. The hallucination is a difficult one, achieved by about 11% of the moderate-to high-susceptible 5s who are given the Profile Scales. Among 19 such successful 5s, constituting the 11% referred to, 9 were able to successfully detect which was real and which hallucinated, on the basis of phenomenal appearance (such as floating above the box, not having a reflection, etc.) which is what Orne's findings are about (Hilgard, 1965, Table 35, p. 134) .
RESULTS RECOMPUTED FROM BASIC DATA
In this portion of my critique, I propose to withhold such criticisms as I may have about the experimental design or about criteria of hallucinations; instead I shall accept the Johnson et al. criteria and proceed to examine their data in the form in which they were obtained and in the order in which they were collected. This I prefer to call an "internal analysis," postponing until later an "external analysis" according to criteria of my own. To make this internal analysis, I shall have to review the experimental procedures and scoring methods to highlight the significant features. The initial exposition will be concerned first with the prevalence of hallucinations and second with the two indexes of trance logic: the reported transparency of the hallucinations obtained and the double hallucination of the assistant.
The major experiment is called Phase I and consists of the study of seven groups of 10 5s each, a total of 70 5s. All 5s were female nurses from Medfield Hospital, Harding, Massachusetts. The three tables in the authors' report are all based on Phase I. Phase II is a small experiment performed later along the same lines with 5 highly suggestible hypnotic 5s and 6 high simulators; the results appear in the text of the published paper but are not reflected in the tables.
In Phase I there were the following seven groups:
1. Group 1A. They were high suggestibles with training, scoring 7-12 on the Harvard Group Scale (HGS) and given training beyond Groups 1 and 2. This group received hypnotic induction prior to a test for hallucinating a person.
2. Group 1. They were high suggestibles without training, scoring 7-12 on the HGS; they were also given hypnotic induction prior to the test for hallucination. " 3. Group 2. It consisted of low suggestibles without training, scoring 0-6 on the HGS, hypnotized exactly like Groups 1A and 1 prior to the test for hallucination.
Because the average score for all 5s on the HGS was 6.6, the division into "highs" and "lows" is approximately at the mean. The authors recognize that the highs are not actually very high, and that is their reason 'for having added Phase 2 to the experiment. 4. Group 3. This Group was comprised of high-suggestible simulators scoring 7-12 on the HGS, instructed to simulate hypnosis but not to become hypnotized, and given hypnotic induction before the test for hallucination.
5. Group 4. This group of low-suggestible simulators.scoring 0-6 on the HGS was treated the same as Group 3. 6, Group 5, This was the high-suggestible imagination control, scoring 7-12 on the HGS. They weje given no hypnotic induction but were told that they were to be given a test of imagination and were expected to do their best.
7. Group 6. This was the low-suggestible imagination control, scoring 0-6 on the HGS, and treated the same as Group 5.
The instructions prior to the main experimental treatment were given by Barber as role instructor, so that the hypnotist-E would be "blind" to 5s tested, except for Groups 5 and 6, which received no hypnotic-type induction.
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The main experiment (Phase I) is conducted in two steps. In order to make these clearly discriminable, I have named them Step 1 and Step 2, have described them separately, and have presented their data separately, as follows.
STEP 1: STRINGENT CRITERION OF HALLUCINA-TION PRIOR TO TESTS POR TRANCE LOGIC
In
Step 1, following attempted induction in the real and simulation groups (Groups 1A, 1, 2, 3, and 4, as just described) and without prior attempted induction in the imagination control groups (Groups 5 and 6), the hypnotist gives the suggestion to hallucinate the assistant Joe, familiar because he conducted a biographical interview with S a few minutes earlier.
The 5 then describes the hallucinated assistant Joe sitting in the chair and what he is doing. If she describes the assistant satisfactorily, she has passed the stringent criterion of hallucination and hence is later questioned about her hallucination in order to study evidence for trance logic. Note that the stringent criterion for hallucination applies only to those who pass the hallucination at this step. If the stringent criterion of hallucination is failed, S moves on to a new set of conditions and a different criterion of hallucination that is described later as Step 2. The two criteria of hallucinations in Step 1 and Step 2 are not two scoring procedures for the same data, but are 4 Barber also served as an assistant in Orne's earlier experiment and his help is acknowledged there. Hence, he was well familiar with both the original experiment and the present one.
• applied to data secured from different 5s obtained under quite different instructions in the two steps of the experiment. This is stated in the paper, but is easy to miss because the authors' Table 2 combines data from both steps as though the "liberal" criterion might encompass the "stringent" one. The Johnson et al. Table 3 describes the transparent hallucinations of those of Step 1, that is, presumably those who were questioned about their hallucinations if they reported stringent-criterion hallucinations at this step; it happens, however, that in treating the data they included as a base for their percentages of transparencies all 5s whether or not they reported hallucinations. Because transparency is a quality of the hallucination, it should only be assigned to a hallucination that is reported; otherwise, there is genuine ambiguity in the report. For example, if nine 5s had solid hallucinations, and one had a transparent one, then 10% would have transparent hallucinations. But according to their method of computation, if only one 5 hallucinated, and he had a transparent hallucination, the answer would be just the same, that is, 10% had transparent hallucinations, even though (as in this example) the only person questioned about his hallucination had a transparent one. Because this method of treating the data leaves entirely ambiguous the number of hallucinators, the general impression is given that there were more hallucinators than there were. The most extreme case, as we shall soon see, is that of the imagination control (Group 6), in which no 5 hallucinated according to the stringent criterion; yet this result enters the statistics exactly as if all the imaginers had hallucinated, but none had reported transparent hallucinations.
Frequency of Stringent-Criterion Hallucinations
One important item of data that is needed is obviously the number of those who passed the stririgent'criterion in Step 1 and therefore could be questioned about their hallucinations. These data were not included in the authors' paper or in the original dissertation, but were furnished to me upon my request. 6 The data are given in my Table 1 . What my Table 1 shows is that the overall success in obtaining hallucinations meeting the stringent criterion was very small, except for the simulators, who would of course be expected to respond.
This simple table of essential data already tells us several things not noted in the original report.
1. Most of the simulators did indeed "hallucinate," although not all of them; 18 of the 20 simulated hypnotic hallucinations when these were suggested, and these were divided equally among the "highs" and the "lows."
2. Hypnotic induction procedures yielded substantially more hallucinations than imagination (10 of 30, compared with 1 of 20, yielding a chi-square by my computations of 4.08, p < .05). The imagination group has thus served as a useful control to show the importance of hypnotic induction in producing stringent-criterion hallucinations, a point not made in the published report.
3. Hypnotic induction procedures yield substantially fewer hallucinations by the reals than given by the simulators (10 of 30, compared with 18 of 20, yielding a chi-square by my computations of 13.4, p < .001). This substantiates the honesty of the reports by the reals, which should be less than the "faked" reports of the simulators. This useful finding also goes unreported in the published account.
4. The imagination control group has become disqualified as a control group for the study of trance logic in Step 1, because only 1 of 20 5s is available for questioning about her hallucinations.
5. The low degree of hallucinations among the "trained" group, only 2 of 10 yielding stringent-criterion hallucinations, shows that something is amiss either in the selection of the 5s or in the extent to which they profited by training.
The authors call attention to none of these findings, either in the dissertation or in the paper being commented upon; without the data supplied upon request, such facts are not available to the reader. In view of these supplementary facts, I find results that would be expected by other investigators of hypnosis, carrying out their experiments in a manner conventional to hypnotic experiments.
The Transparent Hallucination Index of Trance Logic Based on Those Who Met the Stringent Criterion of Hallucination
With the data of my Table 1 before us, we now have a basis for learning what percentage of those who hallucinated at this stage reported transparent hallucinations when questioned. It is to be recalled that Orne reported this effect to be less frequent among simulators than among "reals." After analyzing their data, as presented in their Table 3 , the authors concluded, by contrast, when a stringent criterion for hallucination was used in Phase I, simulators reported the transparent hallucination as often as hypnotic 5s (or imagination control 5s) [Johnson et al., 1972, p. 219] .
I shall now show that this conclusion misrepresents the data.
The data on the relative frequencies with which transparent hallucinations were reported are given in my Table 2 .
The first point as previously noted is that there was only 1 of 20 in the imagination control group who hallucinated, and therefore the imagination control is disqualified for any statistical comparison with the others based on transparency or nontransparency of hallucinations. This makes inappropriate the statement in parentheses in the quotation above: "(or imagination control 5s)."
The next point is that of the 10 out of 30 hypnotic 5s who met the stringent criterion of hallucination, 50% reported transparent hallucinations ; while of the 18 out of 20 simulators who met the stringent criterion, 22% reported transparent hallucinations. Because of the inadequate numbers of hallucinations among the reals these differences are not statistically significant, but the reals reported the transparent hallucinations relatively more often than the simulators, in terms of percentages more than twice as often. A nonsignificant difference based on inadequate numbers is scarcely a basis for asserting that the simulators reported "as often" as the reals. The results do not show the effects to be equal or unequal; any differences are statistically indeterminate.
The Double Hallucination Index of Trance Logic Based on Those Who Met the Stringent Criterion of Hallucinating
After the foregoing portion of the investigation concerned with transparent hallucinations was completed, 5 was asked to turn around and identify the actual assistant seated behind her and then to look back and identify the "hallucinated" person in front of her.
The criterion used to count evidence for trance logic was the acceptance of the simultaneous presence of the hallucinated and the real person. Again, as a reminder, in Orne's experiment he found this acceptance greater among the reals than among the simulators. But again in the section of the stringent criterion of hallucination the authors concluded the opposite.
Examination of the six groups of untrained 5s shows that (a) the simulators (Groups 3 and 4) displayed trance logic, as indexed by the double hallucination, more frequently than either the nontrained real hypnotic 5s (Groups 1 and 2) or the imagination controls (Groups 5 and 6) [Johnson et al., 1962, p. 217 ].
Statistical evidence is provided to substantiate these assertions. Because the same type of analysis was used as in transparent hallucinations, these conclusions are likewise misleading.
The evidence, appropriately presented in terms of those who met the stringent criterion of hallucination, is given in my Table 3 . Again, the imagination control group should be disqualified for a statistical analysis because of the single hallucinator, and any assertion about the quality of hallucinations here is misleading.
Because Table 3 tells us that in every comparison the reals yield double hallucinations at a higher relative frequency than the simulators, the authors' opposite conclusions are denied. The small numbers again prevent statistical significance, but even so by no stretch of imagination can a relative excess in favor of reals be converted into a statistically significant excess in favor of the simulators, as reported in the quote. The results, instead of being unfavorable to Orne, are consistently in the direction of his results. 6 It should also be pointed out that with 18 of the 20 simulators having yielded their data in Step 1, only 2 will remain for Step 2. This means that the simulators will be disqualified from entering statistically into any comparison involving the liberal criterion of hallucination, appropriate only to Step 2, in which only two simulators participated.
Hence we have already reached the only conclusion pertinent to the real-simulator comparison with which Orne is identified, and that conclusion is that Orne is more nearly correct than the critics, according to their data and their scoring criteria.
In fairness to the authors' case, two statements should be added. The first is that Orne secured spontaneous reports of transparency, which the authors found neither in Phase I nor in Phase II. More on this later. The second is that there are some reals and simulators in Phase II, and in concluding the case for the real-simulator comparison they should be mentioned.
For the stringent-criterion hallucinations, the only ones pertinent, four of five reals yielded them in Phase II and five of six simulators. Upon questioning, three of each reported transparency, thus three of four or 75% of the reals, and three of five, or 60% of the simulators. When questioned about double hallucinations, two of each reported, hence two of four or 50% of the reals, and two of five or 40% of the simulators. Despite the small numbers, these results are almost exactly the same of those in Phase I. It would take more cases consistently in this direction to reach acceptable standards of significance, but it does not take any more to deny significance in the opposite direction.
This consistency of greater relative frequency of transparent hallucinations and of double hallucinations by the reals in the only 6 Two errors have been made in this table, as rightly pointed out by Johnson in his rejoinder, but Hilgard has refrained from correcting the table at Johnson's request. The percent for the hypnotic induction (real) high suggestibles should be 2/6 = 33%, leading to a Total X Treatment of 4/10 = 40%. The reader is left to judge what corrections are required in the argument of the text which is also unrevised. (Donald R. Peterson) permissible comparison between reals and simulators has to be reflected against the conclusion reported in the Abstract of the Johnson et al. account: Depending upon the stringency of the criterion for hallucination, the simulating .Ss showed trance logic less often, as often, or more often than the hypnotic 5s and the imagination controls.
This statement is not justified by the data, for in all appropriate comparisons the results showed simulating 5s reporting trance logic by the criteria of transparent hallucinations and double hallucinations with less relative frequency than the reals. There is no point in comparing the simulators with the imagination controls, for they were never compared statistically according to the same criteria: most of the simulators (18 of 20) were in the stringentcriterion group; most of the imagination controls (19 of 20) were in the liberal criterion group; hence, any comparison would have to lie between 18 simulators and 1 imagination control in the first instance, and between 2 simulators and 19 imagination controls in the second instance.
STEP 2: LIBERAL CRITERION or HALLUCINA-TION PRIOR TO THE TESTS FOR TRANCE LOGIC
The 5s who served in Step 2 are the residue who failed to hallucinate in Step 1. When 5 failed to hallucinate in Step 1, E moved directly to Step 2, having S close her eyes, then open them and imagine Joe sitting in the chair. Every S was cooperative, willing to imagine Joe sitting in the chair, and thus to "pass" the liberal triterion'for hallucinating. Having passed this criterion, S was then.questioned to ascertain trance logic by both the transparency index and the double hallucination index. The numbers in each group can be computed by subtracting the hallucinators in my Table 1 from 10 for each group.
The first thing that we are reminded of is that only 2 of the 20 simulators are left for this comparison, so that the simulators no longer qualify as a statistical control for hallucinations by the liberal criterion. Our.comparisons must now boil down to a comparison between the reals and the imagination controls.
The Transparent Hallucination Index of Trance Logic Based on Those Who Met the Liberal Criterion of Hallucination
In order to make a proper comparison at Step 2, it is necessary to derive some data from the Johnson et al. Tables 2 and 3 , because the authors never treated the liberal-criterion hallucinations separately. By subtracting the values for each group in their Table 3 from the  value in Table 2 we obtain the percentage of the whole group (10 5s per group) who reported the transparent hallucination in Step 2; these figures can then be expressed as a percentage of the numbers we now know to have met the liberal criterion of hallucination. The result of these computations is presented in my Table 4 .
It turns out that 17 of 20 or 85% of the reals reported transparent hallucinations, and 13 of 19 or 68% of the imagination controls. The differences are not statistically significant. These data were obtained under conditions so remote from Orne's that there is nothing relevant to say about them, except to note the very high proportions of transparencies reported compared with those in my Table 2 . This is further reason for not combining the results of Steps 1 and 2.
A question arises as to why, with such a very high proportion of transparent hallucinations, there was no spontaneous report of them. This will be discussed later on.
Because the authors have combined the data from Step 1 and Step 2 in their Table 5 (mine) is constructed just as Table 4 was, from those who passed the liberal criterion of hallucination and also reported double hallucinations, as determined by subtracting data in their Table 3 from data in  their Table 2 .
The Double Hallucination Index of Trance Logic Based on Those Who Met the Liberal Criterion of Hallucination
Again, with the only appropriate comparison that between the reals and the imagination controls, we find them essentially alike, with 4 of 20 or 20% of the reals reporting the double hallucination and 4 of 19 or 21% of the imagination controls reporting double hallucinations. It is interesting that these figures are low in comparison with those of Table 3 (for the reals, the only group for which the comparison is possible because of the manner in which the experiment was conducted). Again, the impropriety of combining the stringent-criterion and liberal-hallucination results is evident, because the different conditions led to such different results; the conditions differed, of course, both in 5 selection (Step 2 5s being the residue of nonhallucinators from Step 1) and in substituting imagination instructions for hypnotic-type hallucination instructions in Step 2.
This completes the reexamination of the data actually obtained in the investigation. Without questioning the 'design of the experiment (except for the manner in which it limits comparisons), the reexamination shows that the authors' statistical conclusions from their data are misleading; not enough data were presented for the reader to make corrective judgments for himself. With the data supplied by the authors, I believe I have made the reader's judgment easier through a direct record of what was done and what was found at each step.
I have gone to this length in data analysis to make the point that it is not difficult to mislead readers who are unfamiliar with the phenomena under investigation; had I not seen confirmation of the essential phenomena reported by Orne in my own experience, I doubt that I would have been led to question the Johnson et al. data analysis. If an analysis of data is not appropriate to the basic findings, reported results that are numerically accurate may conceal as much as they reveal.
Why the Claimed Failure to Support the Hypothesis of Trance Logic?
The results are actually reconcilable with Orne's findings, so that nothing elaborate needs to be said. They are not a refutation, but are instead indeterminate. They might even have been supporting had the experiment been designed differently. Therefore, I am now departing from my internal analysis, which I defined as analyzing the data as Johnson et al. could have analyzed them, given their own criteria. I shall now criticize the investigation externally, that is, in terms of design and procedures.
To check on the results of another investigator, the ideal is to go to the trouble to do first what he did, a point that Orne has made repeatedly and one by which he abides (e.g., O'Connell, Shor, & Orne, 1970) . If the results are not confirmed at this stage, then it will be necessary to see what residual differences there may have been in the two experiments. If the results are confirmed as originally reported, then the second investigator is free to make his own modifications, to show that he can put his finger on what in the original experiment led to results that he may consider to be misleading.
I shall specify several ways in which Johnson et al. departed from a precise replication, or from a supplementary design that could fairly test the hypothesis of trance logic.
1. Orne's design calls for highly responsive 5s to be compared with unresponsive simulators. It is not a design for all purposes, but if it is to be replicated, it should first be replicated on its own terms. The "highs" in the Johnson et al. investigation were not high enough; they scored only in the upper half of the distribution of the Harvard Group Scale, which is a useful screening device but insufficient for the purpose of this kind of experiment. The inadequacy of S selection shows up in my Table 1 , in which the number of highs (trained and untrained) who yielded stringent-criterion hallucinations was only 8 of 20 5s.
2. By contrast with the liberal criterion of hallucination (according to which everyone hallucinated), the stringent criterion sounds severe, but it is not a very stringent one. The data show that 40% of an unselected sample (untrained highs and lows combined) passed the criterion; the same percentage is reported for hallucinations according to a similar criterion by Spanos and Barber (1968) . Based on our experience with the double light hallucination, less than 10% of an unselected sample should pass a genuinely stringent hallucination test. In fact, Barber stated that 3% to 5% of 5s experiencing visual and auditory hallucinations within hypnotic procedures believe that the hallucinated objects are actually there (see Barber, 1969, p. 168) . It is possible to grade hallucinations on some scale of reality extending well above the Johnson et al. stringent criterion, and such a grading might have permitted a finer analysis. Orne had his hallucinators interact with the hallucinated person, not merely describe him; hence, his criteria were higher than those used in this investigation.
3. There is something strange about the "trained" highs, for they yielded only two stringent-criterion hallucinations in a group of 10. This could have arisen through faulty selection procedures or faulty training procedures. In the selection of unusually high 5s, Orne used screening procedures rather than training procedures, in order to retain those capable of hallucinations. No such screening was done by the investigators; no 5 was rejected because of poor performance during training, and there is in fact no evidence that the training succeeded at all. Is it a good paradigm of scientific method that permits an "Operational definition" of exposure to a traini4g procedure to become the equivalent of "having been trained?" The natural procedure in this case is of course to determine those who • have profited by training according to some criterion and then to use them in the experiment, rejecting those who will simply introduce "noise" into the experiment by not producing hallucinations that can be classified as transparent or doubled. Even the operational definition of training is in this case somewhat unclear. The Johnson et al. paper refers to "extensive training" specified according to the content of hypnotic suggestions offered, without specifying either the length or the outcome of training. As far as I can determine from the dissertation, since the exposition is somewhat ambiguous, the "extensive training" was probably a single session, for which S was paid $3.00, the same pay as reported for the single session of the experiment proper (Johnson, 1970, p. 64) . No evidence whatever is given regarding the effectiveness of training.
4. If the "highs" were not high enough, the "lows" were not low enough, because they included any 5 from the lower half of the distribution, scoring 0 to 6 on the Harvard Group Scale. It could be that the "trained highs" who hallucinated according to the stringent criterion would not have scored any higher on an individual retest than the "untrained lows" who hallucinated according to this criterion. There is no way of telling. The same applies, of course, to the simulators. It turns out that this may not be critical in view of other problems in the experiment, but it is a point of sharpness of design if more precise distinctions are desired. The authors acknowledge Orne's communications to them, in which these requirements were bound to have been called to their attention.
5. The simulators, in the Orne design, must be those who are not high enough to fall spontaneously into hypnosis, running the risk of producing hallucinations that should rightfully be compared with those of other hypnotized 5s. Hence if the lows are not truly low, and the highs are included, the logic of Orne's design is violated, no matter what the preferences of the replicators may be. In the dissertation it is, in fact, reported that some simulators believed that they fell into transient hypnotic states; they represented half of those who reported transparent hallucinations (Johnson, 1970, p. 100) . It is said that these transient states were confined to a warm-up portion of the experiment, which I do not question. Although this is a minor point that I would ,not care to stress, some ambiguity remains.
6. The Phase 2 study was undertaken to correct the failure to choose extremely high 5s in Phase I. It was not quite successful in selecting only hallucinators, because just four of the five exceptionally high 5s hallucinated under the stringent conditions. The six simulators did not fit Orne's criteria because they were selected also as highs. As shown earlier, the results of Phase II were essentially those of Phase I, if only the hallucinators under each criterion served as the basis for a study of the quality of their hallucinations. It is true that they did not spontaneously report transparent hallucinations in Phase II, just as none had reported in Phase I. The conditions of reporting were alike, so that it is not surprising that reals and simulators who hallucinated reported the quality of their hallucinations (transparent or double) alike, according to the similar inquiry procedures in the two experiments.
7. The reason that no spontaneous transparent hallucination was reported among the stringent criterion hallucinations is quite probably a consequence of the fact that the inquiry methods were less than optimal to elicit spontaneous statements. Rather than ask about transparency before a comparison of the hallucinated and real assistant, a far better procedure is to wait for the double hallucination and then to ask: "Can you tell which is really Joe?" Under that kind of questioning, it has been my experience that transparent hallucinations get reported spontaneously, even though the word "transparent" has in no way been implanted. The authors' question: "Do you, or do you not, see the back of the chair through Joe?" is worded in the do-youor-do-you-not form, but it obviously opens the option of transparency in the reply, and cannot be considered exactly neutral. That the alterna-tive method might have yielded different results is hinted at by one observation reported in the dissertation:
Reals and imagination controls who failed to give the double hallucination responses stated that their image had disappeared, or now appeared "fuzzy" after seeing the real assistant. Qohnson, 1970, p. 94]. This quote shows the advantage of permitting S to compare the hallucination with the real as a method of eliciting spontaneous comments about the quality of the hallucination. Unfortunately, having questioned about transparency first, before evoking the double hallucination, this possible advantage was lost. The method was readily available, because it is the one recommended in connection with the double-light hallucination.
8. The fact that no spontaneous transparent hallucination was present among those who passed the liberal criterion of hallucination is all the more surprising because a total of 32 of 41 of 78% of liberal-criterion hallucinators, on questioning, said their hallucinations were transparent. This may well be due to the absence of any substantial hallucination to begin with. I have asked a few visitors to imagine a monkey sitting on my typewriter and to describe it to me, what it looks like, and what it is doing. They tend to comply and to enjoy telling me what it is doing with its face, or hands and legs, or tail. Not one of them has said anything about transparency, because it is not at issue. When I ask, "Do you or do you not see my typewriter through the monkey?," they look puzzled by the question, but reply, "Of course." This turns out, on questioning, to be based on the fact that their imagination produced nothing of hallucinatory quality at all, even though they met the Johnson et al. "liberal" criterion by describing the monkey. After she had failed to hallucinate according to the more stringent criterion, I am puzzled why any S at all in the study under consideration reported a solid hallucination at this point. The only explanation I can think of is a stronger invitation to role playing evoked by the extreme demand for compliance in Step 2, compared to the demands in Step 1, because 5s in Step 2 had all failed to comply in Step 1.
9. The method of testing for the double hallucination is particularly foreign to Orne's procedure. He was always careful to establish the hallucination firmly first, before turning to the person sitting behind. While the hallucination was also established first in the Johnson et al. study, it was not based on the hallucination replacing the seated Joe with the hallucinated Joe when the eyes were opened, but rather in producing Joe de novo, according to the suggestion: [Johnson et al., 1972, p. 215] .
Note that there is no indication of interaction with Joe as a real person, who can be questioned and can reply, or can himself ask questions. Orne strengthened the hallucination through having 5 interact with the hallucinated assistant; instead the authors now interpose the question about transparency, which could readily weaken the hallucination for those 5s whose hallucinations were weak to begin with. The subsequent questioning began with identifying the real person, rather than renewing the identity of the hallucination; such order effects in questioning are subtle and not to be taken lightly when an experiment is being repeated. The whole issue is, however, rather pointless unless a good hallucination is first established. We have seen how relatively seldom this occurred according to the stringent criterion after noting that the stringent criterion was itself not very stringent.
10. The missing watch hand (see Footnote 5, Johnson et al., 1962, p. 215 ) calls for some discussion. Here again we lack any information about how many reported the hallucination that the watch was defective; without this report, we do not know what to make of those three who gave the response as though the two hands were overlapping. The peculiarity of logic in this demonstration is that S accepts the suggestion that the watch is defective, but then, while reading time from the watch, reads as if it were not defective, forgetting the suggestion on which he is acting. The simulator, responding to the suggestion that a two-handed watch has only one hand, will usually not try to read time from the defective watch; neither will the real in most cases. The fact that the watch is seen as defective is reported by about 20% of the 5s who take the standardized Profile Scales, and, of these, only 1 in 10, or about 2% of the sample, reports the time as though the two hands overlap. The fact that, according to their Footnote 5, one 5 in each of three groups gave this response is in accordance with its rarity; what is critical is that one of these was a simulator. It is to be expected that occasionally a simulator is not naive about what hypnotized 5s do. The simulator must be innocent, a requirement harder to achieve today than it was a few years ago, while the test was being standardized and before its results were widely available in published form. In any case, something highly correlated with other aspects of hypnotic performance, however defined, cannot be readily refuted by observations made under circumstances in which the obtained performance fails to correlate with other hypnotic performances.
11. The imagination group as a control is fraught with many problems. For highly susceptible 5s, imagination instructions readily lead to reports of feeling hypnotized, as shown by Tart and Hilgard (1966) . That hypnosis and imagination have much in common has also been shown by J. R. . It should come as no surprise if an occasional highly susceptible 5 should respond with hypnotic-like performances without a prior induction when circumstances are appropriate. In fact, however, the imagination controls did not respond like hypnotic 5s, only 1 of 20 meeting the stringent criterion of hallucination. They thus serve as a control against the reals by showing that hypnotic induction does indeed help in the production of reports of hallucinations meeting the stringent criterion. This important finding is overlooked by the authors, who instead say such things in summary as "the imagination controls consistently showed trance logic as often as hypnotic 5s." This is based not at all on stringentcriterion hallucinations (for 1 hallucinating imagination control 5 is not a control group), but entirely on the liberal criterion hallucinations, which have little to do with Orne's phenomena.
12. There was a postexperimental inquiry of three questions concerning trance experiences of the 5s, the form of which is included in the dissertation (Johnson, 1970, p. 128 ), but the results of which are not tabulated there nor in the published report. Occasional comments from this inquiry appear in the dissertation, some of which I have cited. I believe that the authors would have helped the reader to know what went on were more of the replies tabulated and reported.
TRANCE AND TSANCE LOGIC
The distinction between a scientific approach to hypnosis according to antecedent and consequent variables is often contrasted by Barber and his followers with what they call the hypnotic-state theory (e.g., Barber, 1969; Chaves, 1968; Spanos, 1970; Spanos & Chaves, 1970) . I have elsewhere examined why the Barber position tends to emphasize the troublesome and adventitious effects that enter into all kinds of psychological experiments, and evades the search for the primary effects or invariants . I do not wish to enter here upon a discussion of the reality of trance as a concept, except to point out that although I use it freely as a concept describing the domain of hypnosis, it is not of central importance to my thinking about hypnosis. I am more interested in the internal consistencies among various indexes of hypnotic performance, such as objective behavior measured on the various scales, observations made by the hypnotist, and self-reports from the person hypnotized. Because of the repeated assertions by Barber and his associates that attempt to polarize those who identify with Barber and those who take more conventional attitudes toward the reality of hypnosis, I wish only to point out that some of the statements, particularly by Barber and Calverley (1969) indicate agreement on a number of phenomena of hypnosis, if not on their interpretation. Barber and Calverley found significant differences between hypnotized 5s and controls, whether the hypnosis is induced by another person or is self-induced. The differences include such matters as subjective reports on "disappearance" of the body or body parts, changes in equilibrium, feelings of unreality, and changed distance of £'s voice. These "trance" char-acteristics are supplemented by reports by 5 of having been hypnotized and by E's observation of hypnotic appearance (limpness-relaxation, "trance-stare," and psychomotor retardation). Although Barber and Calverley made some effort to explain their findings away, these are the phenomena that Orne has said have to be studied to explain the "essence" of hypnosis. Thus, when looked for, there is more agreement on phenomena and their intercorrelations than certain of Barber's statements imply. It is quite surprising to find in the conclusion to the paper under discussion no mention of the positive findings about the hypnotic behaviors commonly reported, but only negative statements, all attributed to Barber, that 5s do not find hypnosis different from waking and do not have a feeling of compulsion.
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Now about trance logic. Regardless of how a replication of Orne's experiment comes out, even if the results were most supporting of his findings, there would be no justification for calling trance logic a general characteristic of all hypnotized 5s, regardless of one's theoretical preferences. The place of trance logic in hypnotic theory rests upon the acceptability of rare phenomena as telling us something informative about hypnosis.
It is an exaggeration to attribute to Orne (or to me) any assertion that trance logic is a touchstone for defining the essence of hypnosis. Orne showed only that a tolerance for logical inconsistencies distinguished a highly selected group of reals from a group of simulators, and in this I agree with him. The following statement shows his cautious conclusions:
It was concluded that in the absence of objective indices of hypnosis the existence of trance may be considered a clinical diagnosis. Until an invariant index of hypnosis can be established, such a diagnosis must be confirmed by the subject's report of alterations in his experience, since the real focus of hypnosis appears to lie in the subjective experience of trance [Orne, 1959, p. 298] .
His statement is fully in agreement with some of the findings that Barber and Calverley have reported, to which reference has already been made. It would be better in the future to search out the reasons for any residual disagreement rather than to launch an attack in the spirit of debate rather than in the spirit of inquiry. CONCLUSIONS 1. Johnson et al. did not adequately reproduce Orne's conditions with added controls, so that their results bear only tangentially on his findings, and, to the extent that they do bear upon them, the conclusions are essentially indeterminate.
2. The data needed for a proper comparison with Orne's study were not reported in the paper, nor in the dissertation on which it was based, but were furnished to me upon my request.
3. The results were reanalyzed according to the order in which they were obtained and according to the criteria imposed by the authors. It was found on reanalysis that only a few of the 5s hallucinated well enough according to the stringent criterion of hallucination to be tested for trance logic according to transparent hallucinations and double hallucinations. The only statistically rigorous conclusions are that the imagination control 5s met the stringent criteria of hallucinations less frequently than the hypnotized ones (and the hypnotized ones less frequently than the simulators who were asked to simulate hypnosis).
4. Some permissible conclusions deny those arrived at by the authors. Thus on the basis of relative frequency, contrary to the authors' reported conclusions, more reals than simulators reported transparent stringent-criterion hallucinations, and more reals than simulators reported stringent-criterion double hallucinations. The results for the imaginations controls are indeterminate, because only one 5 met the stringent criterion of hallucination. The cases are too few to make these results statistically significant, but they suffice to deny that the opposite is proven, as implied by the authors. The results are all in the direction that Orne would predict.
5. The data obtained under the "liberal" criterion of hallucination illustrate socially compliant behavior (since every S hallucinated by this criterion), so that the results are largely irrelevant to the issue at stake. They do serve, however, to point out the inadequacy of the method of obtaining reports regarding transparent hallucinations; if 78% of the hallucinators by this criterion had transparent hallucinations, as reported upon questioning, appropriate indirect methods should have been available to find this out through more spontaneous remarks than replies to a direct question.
6. The authors were apparently side-tracked from examining some aspects of their data by a particular form of antecedent-consequent theory to which they are committed, so that, for example, the fact of exposure to a training procedure was taken as the equivalent of having been trained.
